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
22 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Albert D. Wheelon

SUBJECT : USIB Meeting

The only discussion of importance was about the estimate of the level of Chinese reaction if air strikes were made against air installations in North Vietnam. Sherman, Kent and company thought that reaction was improbable, but Gen. Carter felt that 50/50 would be a better estimate, and Carter's position ended up prevailing. Admiral Raborn observed that the Japanese were willing to quit after the atomic bomb when they determined that they were in fact defenseless, and he raised the interesting question as to whether North Vietnamese might feel the same way and consider a similar course of action if their air defenses were eliminated.

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